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COMMITTEES, POLITICS, SCHOLARSHIP
AND LAW REFORM: ANTITRUST STUDIES
IN PERSPECTIVE
Louis B. Schwartzt
The Attorney General's National Committee To Study the Anti-
trust Laws is the latest of a long series of official investigations of
business organization and control. Among the outstanding studies
in this series were those of the Temporary National Economic Com-
mission (1938-1940), The Pecora Investigation of Banking (1933),
The Monetary Commission (1912), The Armstrong Investigation of
the Insurance Business (1905), The Industrial Commission (1898).'
Inevitably the work of Attorney General Brownell's Committee invites
comparison with these earlier enterprises, particularly the T. N. E. C.
of the Roosevelt administration. It is the purpose of this essay to
make that comparison. From that comparison emerges the conclusion
of this essay, namely, that the organization, working methods and
results of our Committee were largely determined by the political atmos-
phere in which the Committee was conceived and functioned. In
that atmosphere the Committee was bound to recommend, as in my
opinion it did, a retreat in antitrust law and administration.
CONTRASTS IN THE STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION
To BE INVESTIGATED
Both the T. N. E. C. and the Brownell Committee started with
a hypothesis dictated by the political situation. The hypothesis of the
Roosevelt administration was that the ills of the Great Depression
were due to monopolistic practices, the greed and poor judgment of
those shadowy figures in "Wall Street" who dominated and regulated
the economy.2 Particularly after the fiasco of the effort to solve the
depression by putting governmental sanction behind industry self-
regulation, under the National Industrial Recovery Act, it became
necessary to try a new tack, to explore the potentialities of free com-
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Member, Attorney
General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws.
1. See the excellent summary of these and other investigations in Lyxcn, TaE
CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC PoWNER 387-94 (1946).
2. See the chapter on "Creation of the T.N.E.C." in LYNcH, op. cit. mepra note 1,
especially at 17-25 and 364.
(153)
154 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104
petition as the best check against business abuse and the surest incen-
tive to industrial progress. The basic question that will be raised about
the antitrust laws in such an atmosphere is: "Do they need strengthen-
ing? Have we gone far enough to put effective controls on business?"
The hypothesis of the Eisenhower administration was inevitably quite
different. In one of those recurrent swings of national political psy-
chology, the onus of distrust had shifted; the electorate of this later
era saw the current evils as war and communism, not unemployment,
farm distress or business stagnation. War and communism can be
blamed on the "politicians" in power, regardless of party. A booming
economy boosts the prestige of businessmen. It was avowedly a busi-
nesslike, if not a businessmen's, administration that President Eisen-
hower was to lead. In such an administration, the basic questions that
will be raised about the antitrust laws must be: "Have they gone too
far? Do they unduly limit the freedom of the now trusted leaders of
business ?"
It is true that President Eisenhower expressed the hope that the
Attorney General's National Committee would
.. . prepare the way for modernizing and strengthening our
laws to preserve American free enterprise against monopoly and
unfair competition." a
It could hardly have been otherwise. Antitrust has become such a
sacred cow of American political tradition that all proposed changes
must present themselves as "strengthening." 4 In this country one
must go back to an unashamed aristocrat like Holmes for a frank
disavowal of the philosophy of the Sherman Act.5 I do not recall in
the debates of the Attorney General's Committee a single expression
of hostility to antitrust as a concept, despite the fact that the over-
whelming majority of its recommendations did favor defendants. It
all turns on what one regards as "strengthening." Ingenious and
conscientious men can, as the Report does, find it possible to
"strengthen" the antitrust laws by reducing the amount of damages
3. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoMMITTEE To STuDY THE
ANTITRUST LAws iv (1955) (hereinafter cited as REPORT).
4. Cf. Thurman Arnold's conception of the Sherman Act as a kind of official
religion to which we all make obeisance without allowing it to interfere in the prac-
tical affairs of life. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPrrALISm 207-30 (1937).
5. "Between ourselves, I deeply regretted the situation of the Steel Trust Case-
decided 4 to 3-without a majority of the whole court and with the probability that
if the whole court could sit it would have gone the other way. I could not change
my opinion out of deference to that fact, but I have been in a minority of one as to
the proper administration of the Sherman Act I hope and believe that I am not
influenced by my opinion that it is a foolish law. I have little doubt that the country
likes it and I always say, as you know, that if my fellow citizens want to go to Hell
I will help them." 1 HoLMEs-LAsxi LETTERs 248-49 (Howe ed. 1953).
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recoverable by the victims of a conspiracy to violate those laws, or by
expanding defenses and justifications for price discrimination. I have
not the slightest intention of impugning the good faith of such pro-
posals, least of all that of the President, who could have no notion
how the Committee would implement his call to "strengthen" the anti-
trust laws. Just as the New Dealers could honestly say that they
were not "anti-business," but on the contrary were promoting the long-
range interest of private enterprise with legislation like the National
Labor Relations Act, the Securities Act, the Public Utility Holding
Company Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act-and who can say
that events have not confirmed their forecast ?-so it is permissible to
think of measures which appear to be unfavorable to the prosecution as
nevertheless promoting the central purposes of antitrust in the long
run.
6
In the era immediately preceding the organization of the Com-
mittee, the preeminent statement of the conservative hypothesis was
that of Professor S. Chesterfield Oppenheim in his Michigan Law
Review article entitled "Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to
a Revised National Antitrust Policy." 7 It was preeminent because
of Professor Oppenheim's reputation and wide experience, his dis-
interestedness, and especially because the theme which it sounded with
renewed vigor was traditional and honored. For half a century it had
expressed and inspired resistance to the harsh imperatives of antitrust.
That theme is the "Rule of Reason." It was inevitable that Professor
Oppenheim should be given major responsibilities in the Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee.
To repeat, then, both the Roosevelt and the Eisenhower ad-
ministrations approached the task of appraising the antitrust laws
with a predisposition, a hypothesis; and the hypotheses were opposing
ones, in each case dictated by political background. There is of course
nothing wrong with having a hypothesis for investigation; an investi-
gation is likely to be aimless if it doesn't have one. The fact that both
investigations tended to confirm the predisposition of the investiga-
tors may cause one to raise a skeptical eyebrow, but it would be quite
irrational to reject both merely on this ground. One must inquire
as to the technique of investigation employed in each case. The va-
lidity of a scientific conclusion rests largely on the validity of the
method by which it is reached. We return therefore to a contrast of the
6. President Roosevelt's message calling for the T.N.E.C. disavowed hostility to
business and described itself as a "program to preserve private enterprise." See
LYNcH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 25.
7. 50 MicH. L. REv. 1139 (1952).
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organization and method of the Attorney General's National Com-
mittee with other available methods of reviewing the antitrust laws.
CONTRASTS IN COMMITTEE ORGANIZATION;
REPRESENTATIVENESS; EXPERTISE
There are many ways to study the antitrust laws and a variety
of bodies to which such a study might be entrusted. Individual
scholars in law and economics may write treatises or articles upon their
own responsibility. Studies may be carried out under sponsorship of
private organizations,8 some disinterested, others with obvious pre-
dispositions. The executive branch of the Government engages in
studies of the efficacy of the laws which it has a duty to enforce, as
in the publications of the Federal Trade Commission on mergers, re-
sale price maintenance, and marketing restraints in various fields of
business. In addition, in recent years, the Department of Commerce
has given voice to the views of Business Advisory Committees in call-
ing for reexamination of the antitrust laws, especially with a view to
eliminating "uncertainty" which is said to impede legitimate business
activity particularly in international trade.' Bar associations have,
of course, been active in this field.' ° The American Law Institute
has explored the possibility of putting antitrust on its agenda. The
most continuous and well financed activity has been that of the con-
gressional committees. Year after year, they review the work of
the government agencies, hear complaints of small businessmen, con-
duct investigations of practices and structure of big business, and
stage public hearings at which representatives of all points of view
contribute their testimony to the building of enormous printed records.
No one would suggest that the task of appraising and revising anti-
trust law and policy should be delegated to a single scholar, however
8. E.g., The Twentieth Century Fund's Survey of International Cartels and
Domestic Monopoly (Stocking & Watkins, research directors) with a report and
recommendations by a committee consisting of James M. Landis, formerly Chair-
man, Civil Aeronautics Board, Dean, Harvard Law School, Chairman, Securities
and Exchange Commission; A. S. Goss, Master, The National Grange; Marion
Hedges, Special Assistant to the Labor Advisers, Economic Cooperation Administra-
tion, formerly Director of Research, International Brotherhood of Electrical Work-
ers; Donald M. Nelson, Chairman, Electronized Chemicals Corp., formerly Chair-
man, War Production Board; Frank M. Surface, Consultant to Management, Standard
Oil Co. (New Jersey) ; Jacob Viner, Professor of Economics, Princeton University;
and J. Raymond Walsh, Director at Large, National Bureau of Economic Research,
formerly Director of Research and Education, Congress of Industrial Organizations.
Publications included three volumes: MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPISE (1951),
CARTELS OR COMPETITION? (1948), CARTELS IN ACTION (1946); Cf. NAT'L Ass'N OF
MANUFACTURERS, THE AMERICAN INDIVIDUAL ENTERPRISE SYSTEM (1946).
9. See BUSINESS ADVISORY COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE SECRETARy OF COMMERCE
ON EFFECTrVE COMPETITION (1952), summarized in 21 U.S.L. WEEK 1044 (Dec. 23,
1952).
10. See, e.g., A.B.A. SECTION ON ANTITRUST LAW, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE TRIAL OF ANTITRUST CASES (1954).
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learned and eminent, or even to a team of scholars with technical as-
sistants, despite the fact that this is the typical study organization in
physics, biology or medicine. It is important to understand why mere
scholarship or expertise is not enough in dealing with problems like
antitrust. The reason is that goals, values, faith and similar intangibles
must play a large part in formulating antitrust policy. If this were
not true, there could hardly be such disagreement on the subject among
men of equal professional competence in law and economics as one
finds today. If the task had been merely to restate the present law,
expertise, as represented by a small group of lawyers, could have done
the job well enough. The Attorney General needed no committee of
61 lawyers, economists and professors for that purpose. Any such
restatement would, like the Committee's Report, have to indicate that
some applications of the law remain uncertain. The Committee Re-
port does not reduce the areas of uncertainty in antitrust precisely
because whenever it speaks positively on a controversial topic, it is
most clearly expressing policy preferences rather than restating what
is already the law.
Much could be said in favor of the proposition that a new ad-
ministration should restudy the antitrust laws through its own per-
sonnel, perhaps an interdepartmental committee. It is noteworthy that
the Roosevelt administration at first favored this course and that the
issue of executive versus legislative control was sharply drawn in the
maneuvers that preceded congressional authorization of the T. N. E. C.
on a basis of equal representation for Congress and the Executive. 1
Powerful figures like William 0. Douglas (S. E. C.)', Thurman
W. Arnold (Dep't of Justice), Herman Oliphant (Dep't of Treasury),
firmly in control of newly recruited, enthusiastically pro-administra-
tion bureaucracies, were eager to serve on the T. N. E. C. It
is understandable, therefore, that President Roosevelt, reasonably
sure of congressional support in any event, was ready to assume full
executive responsibility for the investigation. The problem of the
Eisenhower administration was quite different. One difficulty here
would be that the people engaged in the study would be pretty much
those who had administered the antitrust laws under the Democrats,
for there had been no wholesale replacement of second level civil serv-
ants in either the Federal Trade Commission or the Department of
Justice.' Another difficulty lay in the lack of effective Republican
11. See LYNCH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 28-31.
12. Cf. charge by Richard W. Slocum, President of the American Newspaper
Publishers Ass'n that "Attorney General and Barnes Follow Will of Underlings" in
filing an antitrust suit against the association. N.Y. Times, May 11, 1955, p. 20, col. 5.
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control of Congress. Congressional acquiescence in reform of the anti-
trust laws could hardly be expected if the proposals presented them-
selves as partisan legislation. Nor would the backing of Business
Advisory Committees or antitrust sections of bar associations im-
prove the political reception of reform proposals. But the most likely
explanation of all for the administration's preference for an outside
agency to formulate its policy on antitrust is that it genuinely desired
independent guidance-the more so because within the numbers of
its own top officialdom, conflicting tendencies could be felt, ranging
from the vigorous trust-busting inclinations of Assistant Attorney
General Barnes, new head of the Antitrust Division, to forthright iden-
tification of national interest with big company interest in some purlieus
of the Department of Defense and the National Security Council.
For reasons already noted, the administration could not use
congressional committees to carry out its antitrust inquiry, despite
some obvious advantages of that method, e.g., representative and po-
litically responsible character of these bodies, subpoena power to com-
pel testimony, permanent staff, funds to retain consultants. Not only
was party control of Congress, and therefore of the committees, liable
to be upset, but there was no tradition of committee investigation of
excesses of antitrust enforcement, which, as I have said, was the hy-
pothesis to be explored. In the political climate of this country con-
servative administrations are driven to quiet deemphasis of antitrust
rather than public hearings avowedly looking towards modification.
An investigation of that kind would hardly be likely to enlist popular
enthusiasm or to advance the political prospects of the participating
Congressmen. It was plainly impossible for the administration to
ask Congress for authority and funds to investigate the antitrust laws,
because the public would never believe that this administration would
be investigating anything but ways of tempering those laws. Debates
on any resolution to authorize the study, as well as the open hearings
which Congress would almost certainly have required, would have
been turned to political advantage by the Democrats. Congressional
support would have meant participation in the study by selected legis-
lators of both parties, with real danger that the pressure from the
minority would precipitate investigations into the structure and prac-
tices of dominant industrial firms. Inevitably, the study became a
purely executive enterprise, with limited financing by the Antitrust
Division out of its regular enforcement budget. No senators or rep-
resentatives served on the Brownell Committee.
In contrast, the Temporary National Economic Committee con-
sisted of six legislators and six representatives of the executive depart-
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ment.'3 Senator O'Mahoney, sponsor of the resolution authorizing
the investigation, became its chairman. Congress appropriated over
$1,000,000 to the work of the committee.
Lacking congressional collaboration or administrative officials
with the prestige and experience of the leading New Dealers who served
on T. N. E. C., the Eisenhower administration nevertheless required
an investigating body whose recommendations would carry weight with
Congress, the courts and the administrative agencies. The composi-
tion of the Brownell Committee was designed to meet this need by its
impressive number (61), by being composed almost entirely of "ex-
perts," and by including, at least in the originally announced list of
invited members, such respect-compelling personages as former Su-
preme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts and Bernard Baruch.1
4
The body had to be reasonably representative, else it would have
no more political weight than the bar association and business ad-
visory groups that had long and vainly sought amelioration of the law.
At the same time its composition must give reasonable assurance that
the conservative hypothesis about the antitrust laws would be the one
explored. A reasonable amount of control had to be maintained by
the Attorney General since he had instigated the study and was paying
for it; but on the other hand the administration had to be insulated
from automatic responsibility for the proposals that the Committee
might put forth. Moreover, the concept of independent expertise re-
quired at least a sharing of directorial responsibility by a scholar. The
Co-Chairmanship of Assistant Attorney General Barnes and Profes-
sor S. Chesterfield Oppenheim admirably served these purposes. Also,
by making it clear that the Committee was advisory only, the Attorney
General guarded himself and the administration against commitment
to recommendations which might be either embarrassingly conserva-
tive, excessively aggressive, or politically dangerous. The Depart-
ment of Justice has, in fact, never made clear how much of the Report
is administration policy.15
13. Cf. earlier investigations: The Industrial Commission (1898) (5 senators,
5 representatives, 9 from civil life) ; The Monetary Commission (1912) (9 senators,
9 representatives); The Pujo Committee (1913) (House committee of 11). LYNCH,
op. cit. stpra note 1, at 387-90.
14. These distinguished men subsequently proved to be unavailable and did not
actually become members.
15. In accepting the Report, the Attorney General said: "Only after careful
study, will we be able to determine which of its legislative recommendations shall be
recommended as administration policy to the Congress and which of its administrative
recommendations shall be adopted." On the other hand, he ventured to predict that
... it will have a heavy impact in stren'gthening our antitrust laws and clarify-
ing our enforcement policies." Dep't of Justice Release, March 31, 1955. But see
note 31 infra.
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The representative character of the Brownell Committee has been
sharply questioned by some newspaper columnists and by members
of antitrust and small business committees of Congress, principally
because of the identification of many of the group as counsel for large
corporations, in some cases even in pending suits involving issues on
which the Report speaks."0 As to this I can say that, assuming anti-
trust expertness, as well as general integrity, was to be the criterion
of selection, there was a fair representation of experts who strongly
favored antitrust; that is to say, if all the available "experts" on anti-
trust were classified into two groups, the strongly favorable and the
moderates (there are no "anti's," as previously noted), the former
group probably had the larger delegation in proportion to total num-
bers. With selection in the hands of men like Judge Barnes and Pro-
fessor Oppenheim, this was bound to be the case, not only because of
their own integrity, but because they recognized as an intellectual
matter that proposals formulated without the benefit of the fullest
criticism from these sources would be the poorer for that reason. More-
over, the debates in Committee never impressed me as advocacy of
clients' positions. It was not unusual to hear men whose private in-
terests would point in conservative directions argue powerfully for a
strong antitrust position on particular issues. Nevertheless it remains
true that the professional experience of a major proportion of the
members was gained in representing defendants. This fact became
crucial in connection with the decision that the Committee, unlike
T. N. E. C., would use "collective experience" rather than fact finding
as the basis for its recommendations. 17 It is easy to see how these
men, summoned from the heat of battle against Federal Trade Com-
mission and Antitrust Division and relying on their "collective ex-
perience," might in all honesty have a very special view of what was
wrong with the antitrust laws.
But the main vice in the composition of the Attorney General's
Committee was the very principle of selection based exclusively on
"expertise." This rested on the assumption that legal technicians are
as qualified to produce an antitrust policy as they are to engage in
antitrust litigation or counseling. This is not true. Technicians are
useful in telling us how to accomplish our purposes, or what diffi-
culties must be faced in seeking a certain goal. Policy, on the other
16. See the testimony of Congressman Patman in Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on Antitrust Law of the House Commnttee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 3, pt. 1, 55, 69 (1955).
17. REPORT at 4. This important decision was made for rather than by the
Committee, which held no meetings during the first year of its existence and so never
debated or voted on the general nature of its aims or program.
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hand, is choice of goal. National policy is evolved by reconciliation
of conflicting goals of different interest groups. This calls for a prin-
ciple of committee selection by interest. Farmers, small business, labor
and consumer groups would have to be represented.", Experts would
have constituted a minority and might even have been relegated to
staff or advisory functions as in the T. N. E. C. and congressional
committees. The contrast between T. N. E. C. and the Brownell
Committee in this regard is rather graphically illustrated- in the role
played in each study by the Department of Labor. In the original
T. N. E. C. resolution, Labor, and not the Commerce Department, was
designated as one of the executive departments to be represented. Con-
servative forces proposed to substitute Commerce for Labor as an
avowedly pro-business gesture. A compromise resulted in both de-
partments being represented on the T. N. E. C.19 In the Brownell
Committee Secretary of Commerce Weeks was a member; the Sec-
retary of Labor was not.
The inconclusiveness of expertise on matters of national policy
is illustrated by the work of our extremely able economist members.
They helped to refine concepts and to cancel out some false notions
occasionally put forward in the name of economic science, but ulti-
mately they split as decisively as our lawyers. When experts fall
out, it is well for the citizen to assume that the controversy has to
do with philosophy or political outlook.
THE DRIvE FOR UNANIMITY
If it was important that the Attorney General's Committee be
representative, at least in the sense that it include experts on both sides
of the antitrust controversy, it was equally important that the final
report appear as a substantially unanimous judgment of liberals and
conservatives. The coupling of these two themes of representativeness
and unanimity is nowhere better expressed than in Co-Chairman Op-
penheim's words on the occasion of presenting the final report to At-
torney General Brownell:
"At this time I emphasize that the Committee membership
was selected to reflect a wide range of responsible viewpoints on
major issues of antitrust policy. A glance at the list of members
makes clear that in this endeavor we certainly have succeeded.
In my opinion, perhaps the outstanding contribution of this Report
is that these interacting viewpoints have produced a unanimous
18. Compare the composition of the Twentieth Century Fund's Committee on
Cartels and Monopoly, supra note 8.
19. LYNCH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 30.
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[sic, notwithstanding a general dissent of six members] state-
ment of basic principles of antitrust policy." 2
A conservative majority report, opposed by a dissent, would be re-
garded, rightly or wrongly, as a partisan or big business recommenda-
tion.
Several steps were taken which gave promise of protection against
the grave threat to the usefulness of the Report inherent in the possi-
bility that the Committee would be split. (1) A plan of operation was
adopted which gave the Co-Chairmen much of the responsibility for
the final report. The Committee was divided into Work Groups
assigned to particular topics which eventually became chapters in the
Report, with the right reserved in the Co-Chairmen to edit the sub-
missions of the Work Groups; and (2) a steady pressure was main-
tained against expression of individual views, beginning with per-
fectly reasonable appeals to compromise mere differences of language,
but mounting finally to absolute refusal to include, except as condensed
fragments distributed through 393 printed pages of the Report, the
general dissent in which six members of the Committee joined.2'
A noteworthy instance of the scope of the "editing" power was
the disposition of the proposal to call upon Congress to review and
reverse the trend toward substituting restricted entry and rate regu-
lation in fields like motor transportation where competition was appro-
priate. In the final meeting of the Attorney General's Committee,
this matter was debated; a special subcommittee drafted precise lan-
guage embodying the sense of the proposal, and the draft was ap-
proved by a large majority. A week or so after this final Committee
meeting, some individual members protested to the Co-Chairmen. As
a result, without any further meeting, or vote of the Committee, this
considered action of a majority of the entire Committee was abandoned
in favor of the following statement:
"Some members feel that, since we have made no factual study
of each regulated area, the Committee should refrain from any
recommendation for general congressional review of the need for
regulation. Others favor a general recommendation to Congress
that the trend toward regulation should be checked or even re-
versed. They emphasize, however, that any such readjustment
must make adequate provision to avoid undue hardship to the
20. Dep't of Justice Release, March 31, 1955.
21. The dissent was privately printed. It was reprinted in 1 ANTITRUST BULL.
37 (1955) and has been incorporated in the printed transcript of hearings held before
several congressional committees, including Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Antitrust Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 3, pt. 1, 247-64 (1955).
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interests affected. Several Committee members favor specifying
the motor carrier industry as an example of unnecessary restric-
tion of competition through regulation of entry and minimum
rates." 21a
I have no doubt that the Co-Chairmen believed, as one of them said
to me, that the Committee majority had not understood the full im-
plications of their vote. Whenever I disagreed with the majority,
I tended to have the same feeling. For all I know, the language of
the Report does reflect distribution of Committee opinion more accu-
rately than the vote. At any rate, I cite the case only to illustrate
the degree of central responsibility assumed.
I hasten to acknowledge that the Work Group organization was
not adopted simply as a device for maintaining effective centralized
control of the final product. On the contrary, much more obvious con-
siderations must have suggested this form of distributing the work load
of the Committee. The field to be covered was vast and intricate.
Many members of the Committee were specialists in one or another
segment of it. Sixty busy people meeting briefly and infrequently
obviously cannot sit as a committee-of-the-whole to draft a report.
What, then, was the alternative? One might have been to have a
preliminary meeting of the entire Committee to approve a list of crucial
issues on which staff personnel or designated consultants would write
monographs. Committee leadership could then have submitted to the
Committee carefully framed proposals incorporating different points
of view and supported by memoranda concisely summarizing the pros
and cons. Such a process would have yielded a much shorter report
dealing with fewer and more important issues, to which it could be
fairly assumed that most committee members had given close con-
sideration. The detail of the underlying staff memoranda could have
been preserved for posterity by publishing them for what they were
-staff memoranda. That was substantially the way T. N. E. C.
operated. In contrast, our Report incorporates what are essentially
staff memoranda, as if the sixty of us really could have considered and
debated the literally hundreds of interpretations, deprecations, lauda-
tions of this, that and the other case or proposition of law or economics
tucked away in the text and fine print footnotes of nearly 400 pages
of print.22 If the other committee members are like me, they are
21a. REPoaR at 269.
22. The -real "staff memoranda," i.e., the original Work Group reports, and, in
some instances, brilliant drafts prepared for the Work Group by juniors in some
committee-member's firm, not only remain unpublished, but have been made the
subject of a pledge of secrecy to protect the authors against charges either of bias
toward their clients or of betraying client's interests.
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still finding in this document interesting propositions of which they
have no prior recollection.
Other consequences of the Work Group structure, beside inflating
the Report and almost necessitating great central control over the final
assembly of separate group reports, are: relatively greater emphasis on
specialist's "expertise" at the expense of overall judgment; some ten-
dency to isolate academic criticism from practical dispositions by put-
ting the professors to work on chapters dealing mainly with abstract
general principles (presumably their specialty) while practitioners con-
centrate on, let us say, "remedies"; and an occasional outright con-
tradiction between different chapters of the Report.' If the choice
of the Work Group principle has the importance I attribute to it, it
is all the more remarkable that this choice was not made by the Com-
mittee. In fact the Committee convened for the first time almost a
year after it was formed. By this time, of course, the Work Groups
had proceeded far along their course.
The persistent pressure for unanimity, previously referred to, de-
serves further reflection. There was and remains in my mind serious
question regarding the duty of individual committee members in such
a situation to yield private convictions in order to achieve committee
solidarity. There are many group situations in which it is clearly one's
duty to do that in order effectively to carry out a common course
of action. For example, publication of differences of opinion among
the general's staff regarding risks and tactics in a prospective battle
would undermine morale. In the political arena, the President can
reasonably expect cabinet differences to be reserved for his private ear.
These are action groups where voiced dissent would impede group
action. I am inclined to think that an advisory group serves the ad-
visee best by indicating precisely how it is divided on substantial
issues. If I were admiral and half my staff were strongly in favor
of sailing north, the other half just as persistently in favor of sailing
west, I should feel quite deceived to be presented with a "unanimous"
opinion in favor of a northwesterly course. So it seemed to me that,
as advisors to Congress and the Executive, we owed them a fair
description of our differing recommendations and the relative support
in the Committee for one policy or another. They are, after all, the
responsible officers; Congress is the place where compromises are
23. E.g., calling dissolution the "obvious remedy" (REPORT at 33) that should
have been applied in the Timken situation (Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951)) ; and citing Timken in the course of an argument that
"judicial reluctance . . . is firmly grounded on considerations of policy." REPORT
at 355. Cf. erroneous statement in my dissenting opinion that "the Tinken case
stands unchallenged . I. " written in reliance on the latter of these references.
The Schwartz Dissent, I ANTITRUST BULL. 37, 41 (1955).
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hammered out in the light of our total policy. There are, of course,
many statements of divided opinion in the Report. But they are on
specific and sometimes quite minor issues. The general effect is of
solid support for the Report as a whole, with occasional reservations
on some particular. On the overriding and central issue, whether anti-
trust enforcement in general had gone too far or had fallen short of
its goal, whether to sail north or west, the Committee never even took
a vote. One had to assemble and count the individual recommenda-
tions and draw an inference as to the dominant policy that was finding
expression in most of these details. Such a calculation made it clear
to me that if "strengthening" the antitrust laws could be said to lie
northward on the political compass, this Committee of Navigators
had laid out for the Captain a meandering course to the south.
Even on particular proposals, the Report does not truly portray
division of opinion. Since most members honestly believed in the im-
portance of achieving unanimity, a kind of bargaining took place.
One of the most striking illustrations of this is the tendency of the
Report to maintain a semblance of deference to certain crucial deci-
sions inimical to antitrust, like the 1920 Steel case- 4 and Appalachian
Coals ' of the 30's. In the former a one vote majority of an incom-
plete Supreme Court (the decision would have gone the other way if
the non-participating Justices had voted) refused to dissolve an amalga-
mation of more than half the steel capacity of the country. In the
latter an obvious attempt at collective price-fixing, during an economic
crisis which the Government was desperately trying to solve by other
price-fixing expedients, was sustained on terms so qualified as to render
it legally hazardous for the parties to proceed in reliance on their
victory. In my opinion men who knew that these decisions were
wrong decided not to express that belief but to be satisfied with the
Report's effort to construe the opinions narrowly. They did so in
exchange for other members' willingness to compromise the great con-
servative crusade for a universal "rule of reason" approach to antitrust
problems. More than once I was told by committee members who had
given years of their lives to enforcing the antitrust laws that, while
agreeing with the central thesis of my dissent, they would not join in
it. They cherished the hard-won compromises achieved in Work Group
debates. They regarded the Report, as whole, as a gratifying job
of "holding the line." This was no time to be expecting to make ad-
vances. This was an era when our forces could count a stalemate as a
victory. I respect these men and their judgments while disagreeing
24. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
25. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
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with them. Their view of the task of the liberals was conditioned by
politics and the times, just as the administration's hypothesis that
the antitrust laws had gone too far was a product of the era. With
antitrust on the defensive, it would indeed be an achievement merely
to stem the attack. Had it been done? Or had the majority, its
numbers unnaturally swollen with real believers in hard competition,
sanctioned a quiet piecemeal retreat?
COMMITTEE RESEARCH--FACT FINDING OR POLICY?
A notable feature of investigations conducted by congressional
committees and famous special commissions of the past has been the
volume of new facts brought out-either in public hearings or pub-
lished staff monographs. The investigation which led to enactment
of the Public Utility Act of 1935 produced 100 volumes of hearings
and reports, describing the actual operation of the business being in-
vestigated. The T. N. E. C. hearings likewise were devoted largely
to testimony about practices and structure of industry. Among the
43 monographs of T. N. E. C. are volumes describing the organization
of trade in steel, insurance, petroleum and moving pictures, as well as
authoritative summaries of antitrust law and economics. Some of the
printed monographs were submissions by the industry commenting on
and refuting staff writings. The 431 page Final Report of the Ex-
ecutive Secretary to the T. N. E. C.26 summarizes the material in the
hearings and monographs. Excerpts from its Table of Contents which
appear as Appendix A to this Article show the extraordinary range
and detail of factual inquiry upon which T. N. E. C.'s recommenda-
tions were based.17 The Brownell Committee leaves no such legacy:
"We stress that our aim is not to add to the storehouse of
statistical data or to survey the economic effects of antitrust ap-
plications to specific industries. These tasks have in part already
been undertaken by others. Undoubtedly, they will again be at-
tempted in testing this Report's specific recommendations or in
some other connection. Instead, this Committee's primary task
is to mark out as clearly as possible the path antitrust has traveled
and what it augurs for the future. In this process, we build, of
course, on the collective experience of prior efforts .... ,, 28
Not only did it fail to produce facts; it gave practically no considera-
tion to the massive factual investigations which preceded it. One may
26. EXZC. SEC'Y OF THE T.N.E.C., FIN L REPORT TO THE T.N.E.C. ox Tm CoN-
CENTRATION OF EcoNOMIC POWER IN THE UNITD STATES (1941).
27. See pp. 170-71 infra.
28. REPORT at 4.
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search the hundreds of footnotes of the Report in vain for references
to the published hearings and reports of the congressional committees
which have operated almost continuously in this field during and since
World War II. As for T. N. E. C. it might as well never have existed,
so far as the Report is concerned. The impossibly voluminous factual
data of previous investigations were never digested for us by staff
memoranda, and I recall very few references to any of this material in
our committee debates. The statement that we built "on the collective
experience of prior efforts" goes far beyond the realities of our op-
eration.
And yet-scholarship and research of a very high order went
into the making of the Brownell Committee Report. The magnificent
talents available in the Committee were devoted to a very special kind
of research, in the words of the Report quoted above: ". . . to mark
out as clearly as possible the path antitrust has traveled . . ."-i.e.,
legal research-without surveying "economic effects" of past deci-
sions on particular industries. "[W]hat it augurs for the future" is
apparently to be inferred by projecting forward the policy line of the
past. That is precisely the kind of research and forecasting that every
skilled practicing lawyer does when attempting to predict what a court
or administrative agency will decide under existing laws and precedents.
It has very little to do with how the law should be changed; and that,
after all, was what this Committee had been asked. To tell whether a
law should be changed one must know how it is working, i.e., precisely
those economic effects on particular industries which the draftsmen of
the Report decline to "survey." Thus it came about that our Com-
mittee succeeded in writing a report on the antitrust laws without
finding it necessary to consider whether the economic and political
effects of organizations like General Motors or United States Steel
call for stronger measures than now exist to combat concentration.
On the other hand, when the Committee was disposed to recommend a
change, e.g., relaxation of the law against price discrimination, or
repeal of the "fair trade" laws, it did so quite without examination of
the actual consequences of past policies on the industries affected. One
finds only references to the theoretical likelihood that strict anti-
discrimination measures will encourage price rigidity 9 or to the logical
29. Cf. dissent of Professor Alfred E. Kahn. REPoRT at 185. See also the tes-
timony of Professor Joel B. Dirlam and Dr. Irwin M. Stelzer, among others,
Hearings Before the Select House Committee on Small Business, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. (mimeo. transcript 1955), pointing out pro-competitive consequences of the
Robinson-Patman Act. Dr. Stelzer reviews in some detail the actual consequences
of orders against price discrimination in corn syrup and cement, pointing out, for
example, that in corn syrup "another effect of the glucose decisions was to ter-
minate pricing practices which had so adversely affected small candy manufacturers
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inconsistency of resale price maintenance and normal Sherman Act
standards. There is not a word, for example, of the documented find-
ing of the Federal Trade Commission that resale price maintenance
costs the consumer money,30 nor, for that matter, any rejection of the
proposition, strongly urged upon our Committee in certain trade as-
sociation briefs, that resale price maintenance preserves small business
without great cost to the consumer. Much as I agree with the ma-
jority position against resale price maintenance, I can hardly expect
Congress to accept this recommendation on the doctrinal grounds ad-
vanced by the Report.
It seems clear that the Brownell Committee's policy preferences
are not supported by its research or even by systematic use of the
factual researches of others.
CONCLUSION
The ultimate impact of the Report remains to be seen. Congres-
sional committees, now in Democratic control, have naturally given it
rough treatment. So far as enacted legislation is concerned, Congress
raised the maximum criminal fine to $50,000 even before the Report
came out with its recommended increase to $10,000 (not enough even
to compensate for dollar inflation since 1890). The United States
has been declared eligible to recover damages which it suffers in con-
sequence of antitrust violations, thus giving force to one of the few
pro-enforcement recommendations of the Report. A uniform statute
of limitations on private antitrust suits has been enacted, coupling a
long-recognized need for uniformity with some novel restrictions on
the period for which damages are recoverable even if the suit is filed
in time. The conservative recommendations of the Report have a
better chance of infiltrating judicial interpretation of the law 31 and
especially administration by the executive agencies. Recent conserva-
that many of them had been forced to move to Chicago in order to survive. One
corn products firm, for example, had maintained a substantial volume of business in
Eastern markets by charging customers there a lower net price than was simultane-
ously being paid by its Western buyers. Here, then, was a perfect example of an
instance in which discriminatory pricing seemed to be necessary if any customers
were to pay lower prices. Yet, when it became impossible for this company to charge
a higher price to its Western than its Eastern customers, it did not simply withdraw
from the less remunerative market. Instead, it cut its base price so that it could
reach the East Coast on a competitive basis, even though this also meant a price
cut for its Western buyers. The abolition of price discrimination in this instance,
then, led to a uniformly lower price to all customers." (Emphasis added.)
30. FTC, REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE (1945).
31. At the suggestion of the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Federal
Courts sent a copy of the Report to every federal judge in the United States. Tes-
timony of Co-Chairman Oppenheim in Hearings Before the Select House Committee
on Small Business, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), according to release of Congress-
man Patman dated Nov. 10, 1955.
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tive tendencies in the Federal Trade Commission, for example, re-
ceived strong endorsement in the Report and may harden into estab-
lished administrative practice.32 On the other hand, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has just held that to condition
a patent license on the licensee's agreement to refrain from dealing
in competitive goods is an abuse of patent. Taking cognizance of
the Report's animadversions on a similar previous holding as "
mere theoretical analysis without consideration of actual commercial
effect. . . ." ' Judge Biggs returns the compliment with the observa-
tion that "the parties, their dealers, distributors, and indeed, their cus-
tomers, are not living in a strange, non-commercial world where exclu-
sive agreements are found under Christmas trees." I Did Judge Biggs
mean to imply that the Brownell Committee lived in such a world?
The most significant feature of the Report from the policy stand-
point is that, in spite of all, it did not succumb completely to the "rule
of reason" philosophy. In principle, the per se doctrine survived; the
distinction between Sherman and Clayton Act standards of legality
was recognized, however frequently compromised; neither foreign trade
nor any other special field was handed over to private regulation in
the name of "business necessities." My principal criticism and sug-
gestions, as submitted in outline to the Antitrust (Celler) Subcom-
mittee of the House Judiciary Committee are set forth in Appendix B
to this Article. 5
At the very least the Report has provided an excellent textbook
for students of antitrust, a good starting point for any lawyer who has
a problem in this field. For all of us it furnishes an occasion for re-
thinking the relationship of law, scholarship and politics.
32. See Note, The "New" Federal Trade Commission and Enforcement of the
Antitrust Laws, 65 YALE L.J. 34 (1955).
33. REPORT at 251.
34. Russell Co. v. Consumers Insulation Co., 226 F.2d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 1955).
35. See pp. 172-75 infra.
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APPENDIX B
OUTLINE-SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY OF PROF. Louis B. SCHWARTZ
OF THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA **
I. On the Report of the Attorney' General's National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws:
A. GENERAL APPRAISAL. Although it contains a few recommendations
favorable to free and fair competition, the overwhelming majority of its
proposals in the field of legislation, interpretation and administration tend
to weaken the antitrust laws. The Committee failed to carry out its mission
to "strengthen" the antitrust laws primarily because it decided to con-
centrate on legal analysis of existing statutes and decisions. Thus it
managed to avoid facing major issues of policy such as whether a pattern
of industry domination by two or three firms requires fundamental change
in the statutory scheme that permits this conditon to continue. Somewhat
inconsistently, the Committee did give effect to its notions of policy in
making numerous proposals whose combined effect is to relax existing law
and impede its enforcement.
B. MAJOR DEFICIENCIES. Among the major errors and deficiencies
of the Report are the following:
1. It makes no effective proposals to prevent further expansion
of dominant firms by merger.
2. It fails to provide for breaking up existing superconcentrations
of control in fields like steel, aluminum, motor cars.
3. It disapproves breaking up monopolistic agglomerations, except
as a last resort, even when they have been convicted of abusing
their power.
4. It approves industry-dominating patent pools, if they exercise
their control "reasonably."
5. It approves price-fixing under patents and restrictive licensing,
without regard to whether the licensor is a dominant firm.
6. It would exclude compulsory royalty-free licensing as an avail-
able form of relief in patent-abuse cases.
7. It encourages exclusive dealing, by making it necessary to show
"actual foreclosure" from the market-a rule which, if appro-
priate in Sherman Act cases, is certainly inconsistent with the
Clayton Act purpose to forbid restrictive practices that are
potentially rather than actually impairing competition.
8. It undermines the Robinson-Patman Act's effort to prevent big
sellers from discriminating unjustifiably among their customers,
and to prevent big buyers from coercing price concessions not
related to the lower cost of doing business with them.
9. It proposes to impair existing right of the antitrust victim to
recover mandatory treble damages and to restrict the period for
which damages may be recovered. It fails to deal affirmatively
with the existing situation under which antitrust victims are
in most cases practically unable to recover even compensatory
damages because consent decrees under Section 5 of the Clay-
ton Act do not make a prima facie case of violation.
** Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust Law of the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 3, pt. 1, 292-94 (1955).
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10. It fails, except in the one instance of Fair Trade, to do any-
thing about the vast sectors of our economy that have been
withdrawn from free competition, sometimes by legislative re-
striction on entry, as in motor and air transportation, some-
times by express exemption, e.g., for collective rate-making by
common carriers and casualty insurers, sometimes by judicial
interpretations like the "primary jurisdiction" rule.
11. The Report does not reflect any awareness that antitrust law
has more than economic significance in American life. Many
Americans believe that economic power must be kept reason-
ably dispersed in order to keep business from dominating
government itself. Others believe that a society of vigorously
independent individuals can exist only where property owner-
ship and entrepreneurial responsibility are widely distributed.
12. The Report contains internal contradictions resulting from
different authorship of various chapters, and does not ac-
curately present the variety of opinions among the Committee
members.
13. The Report says nothing about adequate appropriations for
effective antitrust enforcement.
C. THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY THIE REPORT. Although the
Attorney General's Committee misfired, the very fact that such a Commit-
tee was convened and that it failed focuses on the need for positive meas-
ures in this area and gives the legislative branch of government an oppor-
tunity to "modernize and strengthen" the antitrust laws.
II. A Program for Legislative Action.
A. INVESTIGATION.
1. Further generalized investigation of antitrust problems would
be of doubtful utility. More immediately useful would be a
well-financed analysis-digest-index of the voluminous informa-
tion accumulated in all the post-World War II Congressional
hearings. In addition the following specific topics might be
fruitfully explored, not necessarily by public hearing.
2. A legislative committee might conduct pilot studies of a few of
the very largest industrial giants with the specific objective
of drawing up tentative reorganization plans that would limit
these enterprises to reasonably related activities on a scale
justified by technological requirements. On the basis of sev-
eral such studies Congress would be better prepared to enact
general legislation, patterned on Section 11 of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. -
3. A study might be made of the extent of uncompensated injury
to competitors and the public in several of the more important
antitrust cases of the recent past, especially where consent
decrees have been entered.
4. There should be a study of the number of cases of price-fixing
and other clear violations of the Sherman, Act which have been
disposed of by FTC cease and desist order or by consent decree,
when criminal prosecution would have been appropriate under
the announced policies of the Department of Justice.
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5. There should be compiled a list of the restraint of trade cases
brought against leading firms, to reveal which if any of them
are habitual violators.
6. The actual operation of some leading patent pools might be
closely examined.
B. LEGISLATION INDICATED AS PROBABLY DESIRABLE.
1. Prohibit dominant companies from expanding by merger, with-
out advance approval based upon a showing of technological
necessity.
2. Provide a means for breaking up existing superconcentrations,
organizations like General Motors and United States Steel.
If American Motors is large enough to survive, General Motors
must be bigger than technological necessity requires. If Bethle-
hem and Youngstown are big enough, United States Steel must
be too big.
3. Enact a legislative declaration that competition (free enter-
prise, untrammeled business choice, etc.) is preferable to
private (or public) regulation, except where Congress has
clearly directed otherwise, and that agencies administering
statutes which authorize dispensation from the rule of com-
petition "in the public interest" or "to promote the national
transportation policy" shall not grant such dispensation un-
less available alternative methods of promoting the alleged
public policy are shown to be less practicable. It should not
be enough to show that a merger inconsistent with the anti-
trust laws is "consistent" with the public interest.
4. Declare legislatively that the restrictive practices specifically
named in the Clayton Act are unlawful without inquiry as to
their competitive effects in a particular situation, when engaged
in by dominant firms.
5. Prohibit restrictive licensing of patents by dominant patentees
and the combination of dominant companies in patent pools.
6. Amend Section 5 of the Clayton Act to make it discretionary
with the court whether a consent decree shall be available to
help private plaintiffs make out a prima facie case; in the
alternative, provide a procedure for compensating all antitrust
victims upon the successful conclusion of any government case.
7. Amend the Motor Carrier Act to eliminate control of entry
and rates, as well as exemptions from the antitrust laws, direct
the C.A.B. to establish conditions which will make possible new
entry into trunk line air transportation.
8. Repeal the Reed-Bullwinkle authorization of collective rate
making by railroads, and the McCarran Act exempting certain
insurance operations from the antitrust laws.
9. Repeal the McGuire Act authorizing resale price control in
interstate commerce.
10. Raise the maximum fine for violations of the Sherman Act to
at least $50,000.
11. Permit the United States to recover as a party injured by anti-
trust violations.
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12. Create a permanent Free Enterprise Commission to take over
the antimonopoly functions of the Federal Trade Commission
and to make antitrust investigations, reporting to the Depart-
ment of Justice which would conduct litigation before the
courts. Among the powers and responsibilities of the Free
Enterprise Commission would be the following:
(a) Power by regulation to define and prohibit anticompetitive
practices.
(b) Power by regulation or order to prevent integration not
justified by production or distribution economies, and to re-
quire advance approval for certain classes of such transactions.
(c) Power to compel the reorganization of excessively large
enterprises into units conforming with the standard of para-
graph (b).
(d) Power to make exemption under standards defined by
statute.
(e) Authority to appear before any government agency, in-
cluding Congressional Committees, to present testimony or
argument as to the implications for free enterprise of the matter
before the agency.
(f) A duty to report annually on the state of free enterprise
in the country and to propose legislation for the further pro-
tection of free enterprise.
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